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Institutions in a World System
Contours of a Research Program
Stephan Panther
Abstract
In this paper I sketch the contours of a research program which draws on the insights of 
both institutionalist theories of long term economic change and world system analysis 
in order to analyze the many ways in which national and global inequalities interact. 
While the political economy approach developed in the research program of Acemoglu 
and Robinson has provided important insights on the relationship between national 
inequalities and economic growth, world system analysis focuses on interactions 
and asymmetries in the global economic and political system and their effects on 
national trajectories. On the one hand, I propose ways to make national institutions 
endogenous to international economic and political interaction via the influences 
these may have on national inequalities. The key to this discussion is the realization 
that the impact of international economic interaction on domestic distribution may be 
changed significantly, even in sign, if rights are weakly enforced and “grabbing” type 
redistributive activities are ubiquitous, especially inside and by the state. On the other 
hand, I explore the gains from looking at the world system as an institutional system, 
applying ideas developed by Acemoglu and Robinson, and North, Wallis and Weingast 
to analyze inequalities and asymmetries in countries to the entire globe. Here, both the 
question of whether a global elite coalition is to be defined as a group of countries or 
as a network of global elites in states, business and media and the question of how the 
international institutional order limits access to global political and economic resources 
are central. 
Keywords: center-periphery | income distribution | institutional theory
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1. Introduction
Inequality is back on center stage in mainstream economic thinking about long run 
economic development. It got there accompanied by a focus on institutions. Both got 
on stage by a remarkable return of historical analysis in economic thinking about long 
run economic change (cf. Nunn 2009 for a reasonably recent overview). Comparing 
country experiences in search for “natural experiments” became a core method to 
look for and evaluate explanations for the “great divergence”, the immense increase 
of global inequality over the course of at least the last five centuries. Differences in 
national institutions and inequality of access to resources on a national level loom 
large in the explanations discussed. 
However, while historical analysis has experienced a remarkable comeback, the 
intellectual history of debates in academic discourse itself has not, especially if these 
debates were ideologically polarized. Thus, the historical turn in mainstream economic 
thinking about long run economic change has taken place in complete disregard of the 
debates of the 1970’s and 80’s, centering in the challenge of dependency approaches 
to the received wisdom of modernization type narratives. The key idea: Rather than 
domestic conditions, the workings of the international division of labor itself determine 
economic change in a country over time. 
While the dependency perspective has all but vanished in the social sciences, its 
intellectual heritage has lived on to a considerable extent and has been developed 
further in world system analysis, a research program initiated by Immanuel Wallerstein. 
I think it is fair to say that mainstream economic analysis and world system analysis live 
in intellectual isolation from each other, not taking notice of each other’s achievements. 
This paper builds on the conviction that this state of affairs is detrimental to scientific 
advance. 
As a very first step to change this situation of “intellectual apartheid”, in this paper 
I sketch the contours of a research program which draws on the insights of both, 
institutionalist theories of long term economic change and world system analysis in 
order to analyze the many ways in which national and global inequalities interact. More 
specifically, convinced that the institutionalism turned political economy developed in 
the research program of Acemoglu and Robinson has provided important insights on 
the relationship between national inequalities and economic growth, I on the one hand 
propose ways to make national institutions endogenous to international economic and 
political interaction via the influences these may have on national inequalities. On the 
other hand I explore the gains from looking at the world system as an institutional 
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system, applying ideas developed to analyze inequalities in countries to the entire 
globe.
I start by introducing the research program of Acemoglu and Robinson which most 
clearly relates inequality in the access to political and economic resources to issues of 
national economic performance in Section 2. This I contrast by an interpretive sketch 
of Wallerstein’s world system approach in Section 3. In Section 4 I explore different 
ideas for endogenizing national institutions via the influence of international economic 
interaction in trade, migration and finance as well as via political/military interaction. In 
Section 5 institutions meet the world system: consequences of considering the world 
system as an institutional world system are explored, drawing on ideas developed in 
the analysis of countries. Section 6 takes a step back before returning to the issues 
raised in Section 5. It offers some conceptual consideration about geographical space 
– which had been neglected previously – and points out some initial ideas flowing out 
of this exercise. Finally, Section 7 provides a summary of key ideas, directions pointed 
to, and discusses some omissions.
2. A Political Economy of Long Run Economic Change: 
 Acemoglu and Robinson 
Starting with the publication of their seminal paper (Acemoglu et al. 2002) Acemoglu 
and Robinson, initially in close collaboration with Simon Johnson from MIT, over the 
last decade have extended the institutionalist explanation of economic performance 
into a political economy of long term economic change. In their chapter in the 2005 
edition of the Handbook of Economic Growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) they summarize 
their general approach. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) is a book length treatment for 
a wider audience.
By making the economic performance at any point in time depend on the institutions 
regulating the economic sphere, Acemoglu and Robinson reaffirm the prevailing 
institutionalist orthodoxy which has been established over the last two decades. By 
emphasizing distributional preconditions and consequences, they transform it into a 
political economy approach.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005a) define “economic institutions” as those rules of society 
which have a direct impact on the rewards from economic activities and thus shape 
the incentives economic actors have, especially the incentives to invest in physical and 
human capital, the incentives influencing the organization of production and technology, 
and the incentives to innovate, both technologically and organizationally. They have a 
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decisive influence on economic performance. Acemoglu and Robinson do not deny 
that there are a multitude of other factors influencing the economic performance of an 
economy at any point in time. Some of them are temporary, such as external events, 
some are relatively enduring, such as geographical conditions and culture. However, 
economic institutions are central (Acemoglu et al. 2005a: 389). 
Any economic outcome implies a certain distribution of income and wealth. The 
distribution of material resources, in turn, is a key determinant of the distribution of 
political power between different groups in a society. This “de facto political power” 
of social groups, as Acemoglu and Robinson call it, is one key variable determining 
economic and political institutions. The second key determinant is the ability of a group 
to overcome the collective action problem (Acemoglu et al 2005a: 392). While the latter 
ability is a kind of shift parameter for their analysis, the distribution of resources is a 
cornerstone.
Acemoglu and Robinson recognize the – partial – autonomy of the political sphere, 
the sphere of collective decision-making about the rules of the game: Political power 
of social groups is determined also by the rules for collective decision-making of a 
society – “political institutions” in Acemoglu and Robinson parlance – resulting in “de 
jure political power” (Acemoglu et al. 2005a: 392).
Actors use their de jure and de facto political power to influence decisions about both, 
economic institutions on the one hand and the rules of future rulemaking – that is, 
political institutions – on the other hand. 
Thus, while the proximate causes of economic outcomes are economic institutions, 
political power, determined both by the formal rules of the political game and the 
distribution of resources and whatever else may determine de facto political power, 
determines economic institutions.1
1 While this essential influence of the distribution of economic resources on both political and economic 
institutions is natural in many intellectual traditions, in mainstream economics Acemoglu and 
Robinson have to fend off an objection: Why should political strife about economic distribution stop 
interest groups from trying to make the “cake” to be divided as large as possible? This objection is 
based on the Coase theorem (Coase 1937). It shows the independence of efficiency from distribution 
in the economic sphere in the absence of transactions costs even if property rights are not perfectly 
defined and enforced. Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize the failure of a political Coase theorem 
due to the inability of political parties to commit not to use a major shift in de facto political power 
implied by a change in economic institutions to change the political institutions in their favor. Political 
transactions costs – usually much higher than transaction costs in markets – add to this. Under these 
conditions, distributional issues may adversely affect efficiency and therefore growth (Acemoglu et al 
2005a). 
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Conflicts between the efficient use of resources and the maintenance of a political 
regime based on the political and economic privileges of a – comparatively – narrow 
elite may arise. In other words: Certain technological or economic changes leading to 
an increased national income may threaten the economic or political position (or both) 
of the dominant group, which then has the choice between having a large share of a 
small pie or a smaller share of a larger pie – and may well go for the former. In other 
words: wherever a highly unequal income distribution is based on a systematically 
unequal distribution of political and economic resources inequality may be a stumbling 
block for economic growth.
The system is recursive and dynamic. Exogenous events as well as endogenous forces 
of change as a consequence of economic growth and technological change make it a 
spiral through time rather than a closed system.
In the context of economic neoinstitutionalism the approach of Acemoglu and 
Robinson incorporates the early traditions of the “New Economic Institutionalism” by 
Douglass North and others on the importance of economic institutions on economic 
performance. It bypasses the second generation approaches which have emphasized 
the importance of informal norms, frequently under the heading of “social capital”. It 
does so by focusing on the political process and the role of formal institutions. To some 
extent this is a limitation, because these second generation approaches are likely to 
be complementary to the Acemoglu and Robinson framework (e.g. Acemoglu et al 
2005a). Especially the social capital approaches have an important relationship to de 
facto political power by theorizing the collective action capability of social groups in an 
interesting fashion, a line of inquiry certainly worthwhile pursuing within an extended 
Acemoglu/Robinson perspective (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2005a). 
On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005a) were able to reopen the inquiry 
into the role of the distribution of economic resources and political power in the context 
of mainstream economics only by downgrading issues of collective action to a shift 
parameter some four decades after Mancur Olson had redirected intellectual efforts 
in the economic mainstream. Having done so in a highly successful and paradigmatic 
fashion amounts to a revolution in the way mainstream economists think about political 
economy and institutions.
However, in another central point of departure, Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et 
al 2005a) remain tied to the tacit assumptions of economic neoinstitutionalism: They 
focus on the distribution of economic resources and institutions on a national (and 
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sometimes regional) level. International interaction of any kind is secondary at best,2 
international institutions are not considered. It is as if each country were sitting in its 
own little box and only internal conditions were decisive for the course it follows in 
history. This I consider a central weakness, to some extent astonishing in an age talking 
about globalization so much, a weakness only explainable by the neat separation of 
intellectual traditions from each other both synchronically and diachronically. The next 
section will discuss another intellectual tradition, sitting at the opposite end of the 
national vs. global continuum. 
3. A Selective Reading of World System Analysis
World system analysis is an intellectually vibrant descendant of intellectual debates 
centered on international inequality and development in the 1970’s. In that decade, 
the appearance of the first volume of Immanuel Wallerstein’s monumental work 
(Wallerstein 1974) was part and parcel of a wider intellectual movement countering 
modernization type of narratives with a critical account. The main takeaway point: Not 
the internal conditions of a country determine its path in the world economy, but its 
position in the world division of labor. Once the country has entered the capitalist world 
system as a periphery, whether by voluntary interaction or forced by colonialism, it was 
destined to stay there for a long time unless the working of the world economy would 
change fundamentally. More specifically, according to Wallerstein, the capitalist world 
economy depends on the existence of center and periphery (and semiperiphery, an 
intermediate category). The mix of countries belonging to each club may change once 
in while over time, but in this approach the distinct types of countries are an essential 
part of any capitalist world economy (Wallerstein 1974). 
In the following I will explore these ideas somewhat more in detail. Far from being a 
survey, this is a selective perspective, based on my reading of Wallerstein’s (2004) 
own introduction into his approach.
One central tenet of Wallerstein’s (2004) approach is the idea that the characteristics 
of economic activities determine center and periphery. In other words, there are center-
like economic activities and there are periphery-like economic activities. 
2 It is important to emphasize here that external influences are not absent in the work of Acemoglu 
and Robinson. Indeed some of the central arguments in Section 4, especially in Section 4.1 on 
trade, are derived from work either by the two authors themselves or by authors following similar 
approaches. The key issue here is that their research program (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) has not 
explored the interaction between the international division of labor and institutional lock-in or change 
in a systematic fashion. 
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Center-like activities are innovative, quasi-monopolistic industries producing goods the 
quality of which is difficult to ascertain. In order to function well, they need a set of 
complementary state policies: patents, subsidies, standard setting, the demand of the 
state as a purchaser of their goods, e.g. military procurement. In order to be able to 
invest with a long time horizon in large scale industrial structures, R&D (Research and 
Development) and the like, center like activities also need relative political stability and 
internal peace, a state approaching the Weberian ideal of a monopolist of legitimate 
violence. Tax burdens result in the production of these complementary conditions. Tax 
evasion is relatively low (Wallerstein 2004). 
Periphery-like activities are highly competitive and produce standard goods of easily 
verified quality. Their demands on state policies are reduced, sometimes massively. 
Price competition abounds. Profits are low. Using state power to redistribute wealth 
becomes an irresistible temptation. State control becomes highly contested, internal 
security suffers. Taxes are seen as burdens, and tax evasion is endemic (Wallerstein 
2004).
Center-like activities create well-governed states. Their citizens benefit from the rule 
of law and effective bureaucracies based on meritocratic access to office as well as 
other institutional and policy features seen to be favorable if not essential for modern 
complex economies (Wallerstein 2004). 
Periphery-like activities create badly governed states or more precisely, they create 
states suffering from structural cleavages where the benefits of good governance 
are concentrated in those few areas, geographical and functional, where they deem 
appropriate – not for the general public (Wallerstein 2004). 
Trade between the center and periphery suffers from unequal exchange. Due to 
differing levels of monopoly, surplus is transferred to the center. 
The relationship between center and periphery has an interesting dynamic generated 
by long waves of technological change, the so-called Kondratieff cycles. Early on in 
the cycle more production activities are innovative and complex, the technological-gap 
between center and periphery widens, the center becomes stronger. Late in the cycle, 
technological diffusion has outpaced innovation: The technological gap between center 
and periphery becomes smaller, the center becomes relatively weaker (Wallerstein 
2004).
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In the field of politics the capitalist world system thrives on the “interstate system” of 
sovereign states. Capitalism depends crucially on the absence of a “world empire”. 
Only under this condition can the historical domination of production and exchange by 
state forces be avoided. In the European center, the system of a balance of military 
power first created this condition. It was the result of competition between the major 
states for capital and technology in order to bring about military advantage (Wallerstein 
2004). 
Competition between states of different strength creates room for strong states to 
intervene in the internal affairs of weak states. This may take different forms. Strong 
states may force weak states to open up economically in areas of interest to strong 
states while refusing to reciprocate. Strong states may pressure weak states to side 
with them in international conflicts. Strong states may install governments of their liking 
in weak states (Wallerstein 2004).
Historically, the strongest form of interference of strong states was colonialism. 
Colonialism occurred when strong states did not find internal bureaucracies capable of 
implementing the conditions for the expansion of the world system locally. They then 
took control and implemented the conditions for firms from the strong state to work 
profitably in the colony. Decisions were taken in the interest of the colonizing powers. 
Access of other strong states was usually prevented, at least restricted (Wallerstein 
2004).
In the realm of culture the capitalist world system manifests itself as a “geoculture”. 
Its central tenet: ever since the US and French revolutions there is the recognition in 
social thought that social change is inevitable. Already early on in the process, three 
reactions to this recognition – novel in world historical terms – developed: Conservatism, 
attempting to slow down change, liberalism, attempting to direct change and radicalism 
attempting to accelerate change. Historically, liberalism became dominant (Wallerstein 
2004). 
Over time, radical anti-systemic movements helped to stabilize the system, by providing 
the necessary political self-correction to self-destructive dynamics in the system. This 
is also the case for the tendency towards different types of ideologies prevalent at 
different levels of the social pyramid. At the top, universalistic ideas provide the support 
for global economic interactions. At the bottom diverse “divide and rule” ideologies 
legitimize the inequalities in the world system: sexism, racism, nationalism (Wallerstein 
2004).
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As stated above, this is no more than a sketch of a very elaborate theoretical and 
empirical edifice which again is but a cornerstone of a paradigm of social enquiry. 
However, this should suffice to see how distinct this perspective is from the previously 
presented one. It is thoroughly relational. What happens in any part of the system 
cannot be understood without looking at the system as a whole, both in terms of the 
relations between center and periphery as well as in terms of the relations between 
“economy”, “politics” and “culture.” 
By way of contrast, as summarized at the end of Section 2, while Acemoglu and 
Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) present a theoretical perspective connecting politics 
and economics in a fundamental and insightful fashion, they leave their countries in 
boxes, their destiny depending fundamentally on internal conditions. I am convinced 
that this is hardly plausible even if one does not go along with every tenet of world 
system analysis. Global inequality and interaction do impact on the destiny of any 
place in the world interacting with internal conditions, and I hypothesize that they do so 
in an essential way. 
Building on this, in the rest of the paper I will sketch two perspectives on how the two 
approaches outlined so far can be made to relate to each other in fruitful ways, focusing 
on the role of institutions. In this way I hope to contribute to an end of the intellectual 
apartheid which has characterized the relationship between approaches centering on 
global interaction and approaches focused on internal conditions in recent decades, as 
outlined in the introduction. 
4. Endogenizing Institutions ‒ an Interactionist Perspective
In what I call an interactionist perspective, countries are taken as units of analysis. 
However, the focus of attention lies in the relations (interactions) between different 
types of countries, between peripheral and central (and semi-peripheral) states. More 
specifically, causal sequences will be proposed where international interaction has the 
potential to lock a periphery into its peripheral status via an institutional channel (and 
conversely, lock states in the center into their advantageous position).
In other words, rather than taking the quality of institutions in a country as exogenous, 
I want to outline avenues of thought which make them endogenous to a countries 
position in the international division of labor. Or put in yet another way: I look for 
potential vicious (and virtuous) circles driven by a country’s position in the international 
division of labor in which institutions play an important role. 
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To do so, hypotheses about institutional change are needed in order think about how 
international interaction will impact national institutions. The Acemoglu and Robinson 
approach (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) of course already offers such a perspective focusing 
on inequality of income, wealth and political power as a deep determinant of institutions 
and institutional change. When focusing on the interaction between a peripheral nation 
and a nation in the center, national inequality therefore is looked at in terms of its 
entanglement with global inequality. 
How would economic interactions like trade, migration, or financial flows interact 
with the framework by Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) described 
in Section 2? Since national institutions are determined by the distribution of political 
power, the impact of international economic interaction on the latter has to be looked 
at. The main focus will be on “de facto political power”, the influence of international 
interaction on the distribution of resources between social groups. 
Analytically, two separate effects can be distinguished, even though they are more 
or less intertwined in real life. First, international interaction may change the rewards 
from activities undertaken in a country and thereby alter the distribution of resources 
resulting in changes in de facto political power. This will be the perspective used below 
when looking at trade. Second, international interaction may provide an additional 
outside source of resources for social groups in a differentiated way – but may also 
create an additional demand on domestic resources. This perspective will be brought 
to bear on issues of migration and finance.
Political interaction will also be looked at even though very close to the global 
perspective opened up in Section 5. Here again the perspective of selective access to 
additional outside resources or selective drain to domestic resources is relevant from 
an Acemoglu/Robinson perspective. One historically very important form of interaction, 
the direct domination of the countries of the Global South by the Global North in the 
form of colonization – a direct influence on the “de jure political power” in a country – 
will not be considered here, since it is not the main channel of influence today. 
4.1 Trade, Distribution of Income and Institutions
The best starting point to discuss distributive issues related to trade is the international 
(or more recently, global) political economy literature. Here we find a well-established 
line of inquiry asking how international trade (indeed, to some extent, how all economic 
interaction) influences the distribution of income of different social groups and hereby 
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the policy stances of those very groups concerning trade policy (see Hiscox 2014 for 
an overview). 
One of the well-established starting points of the literature is based on the Heckscher-
Ohlin model of international trade.3 Named after two Scandinavian economists who 
developed it in the early 20th century, it remains a working horse of mainstream 
international trade theory. It predicts that after trade, returns to the factors of production 
relatively abundant in a country (relative to the world at large) will rise, while returns to 
the relatively scarce factors of production will decrease. Interest groups representing 
those most affected by these shifts will try to influence policy accordingly.
Little is usually said about the effect these changes in the returns to factors of production 
have on the personal distribution of income, so central in the political economy of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2005a). Here, however, we can identify 
certain interesting effects. 
Take for example the effect of globalization. Globalization translates into the world of 
trade as trade liberalization. The abundant factors in the countries of the Global North, 
capital and skilled labor, have profited from globalization. Ownership of capital at least 
is highly concentrated even in the relative egalitarian countries of the North, while 
access to education tends to be more egalitarian. Nevertheless, we should expect 
globalization to have contributed significantly to greater inequality of personal income 
in the North resulting in the greater political power of established classes frequently 
diagnosed. Thus, in the Global North trade can be expected to have contributed to 
undermine the “class compromise” present after World War Two – not the virtuous 
circle we were looking for.
4.1.1 Trade and Institutions in the Global South – (In)Equality of Power and   
 Ownership in the Case of Natural Resource Abundant Countries
How about in the Global South, the global periphery? In the logic of the above, we 
should distinguish between countries where natural resources are the abundant factor, 
as in most of Latin America and Africa, and countries where unskilled labor is the 
abundant factor, as in most of East and South Asia. 
Ownership of natural resources can be very different from country to country and 
from resource to resource. Agrarian resources especially might be concentrated in 
3 See Feenstra (2004) for a good recent up-to date exposition, and Helpman (2011), sections 2.2 and 
3 for an introduction for a wider readership written by a leading scholar.
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the hands of a few (or few powerful processing companies may effectively carve up a 
market of dependent smallholder suppliers between them) or distributed in the hands 
of many (who managed to gain market power by organizing processing cooperatively). 
Consequences of trade on the personal income distribution will very much depend 
on how history has settled this issue. In countries with a latifundista structure, trade 
will strengthen the power of an established elite; in countries with more egalitarian 
agrarian structures, it may actually support a more egalitarian political power structure. 
This is very much in line with the results of a research project in the tradition of 
dependency theory by Dieter Senghaas and Ulrich Menzel in the 1980s, well 
summarized by Lars Mjøset (Mjøset 2007; Senghaas 1982 and Menzel 1988 are 
important publications which grew out of this project). In a series of case studies 
starting from a very different theoretical framework, they also concluded that agrarian 
egalitarianism, if followed by early modernization of the agrarian sector, was central to 
prevent “peripherization pressure” from generating peripheries. The main mechanism 
was the type of political history: more egalitarian agrarian structures led to more 
democratic structures while less egalitarian agrarian structures were more conductive 
to autocratic structures. Both would tend to open to trade ‒ and in both cases the 
existing power balance will be supported by trade.
In the recent stream of literature on the resource curse (Venables 2009), attention 
has been drawn to yet another issue, absent in the international political economy 
discussion of the influence of trade on income distribution. In that discussion, in whatever 
way resources are distributed, property rights over those resources are well defined 
and enforced. In the weak institutional orders in many peripheral countries, however, 
exactly this is not the case: redistributive, “grabbing-type” activities by powerful private 
actors or the state are a central feature of these weak institutional orders – could this 
change the impact of trade?
It seems likely to do so: Under secure property rights, increased rewards for an 
economic activity are a chance to become rich. Under insecure property rights, they 
are a potential threat to become a target for redistributive, “grabbing” type, activities, 
in the extreme case violent ones (a good summary of the argument is in Robinson 
and Torvik 2011). This is a theme well represented in the resource curse literature (a 
much cited article being Mehlum et al. 2006), however with a clear emphasis on oil and 
other mineral resources. In Marxist-inspired literature this theme is echoed by work on 
the reappearance of primitive accumulation as a consequence of globalization (see 
e.g. Harvey 2005). However, no consensus has yet emerged concerning the relevant 
processes and causes.
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What is clear, however, is that here we have a mechanism potentially driving a 
vicious circle: Peripheral countries with a comparative advantage in natural resources 
and relatively weak institutions at the outset are driven down a slippery slope of 
deteriorating institutions, with “grabbing” becoming more profitable, approaching civil 
war or Hobbesian anarchy at the extreme, while core countries with strong institutions 
can channel the benefits of trade in natural resources into growth.
A very interesting inquiry along these lines is Acemoglu et al. (2005b). The authors 
argue that economic windfall gains to be harvested from the opening of the Atlantic 
trade for Western European nations had different effects in different countries, very 
much depending on institutional conditions. The greater the power of parliament 
(nobility and traders) against the central power of the king, the more beneficial the 
opening up of Atlantic trade became, but where the king could appropriate the gains 
from trade by monopolizing, by forcing credits, defaulting on debt, etc., no positive 
effects on growth appeared. Britain and the Netherlands forged ahead, while Spain 
and France failed to capitalize on the opportunity. The empowerment of the merchants 
and the nobility in the first case and the central power in the latter quite possibly led to 
a decrease in the quality of institutions in the latter case and to an improved protection 
of rights in the former.
Note that hidden in this type of argument are always more or less unequal balances 
of political, economic and military power. Only if this power is sufficiently unequal, 
“grabbing” becomes worthwhile.
4.1.2 “Grabbing” Extended – Trade and the “Demand” for Labor Coercion 
Let us go back to resource-rich peripheral countries and their characteristics. Extending 
the distinction made earlier, it is probably fair to say that they are relatively resource-
abundant because they are not relatively abundant in low skilled labor – peripheral 
countries not being rich in capital and high skilled labor by definition. This means, 
however, that in resource-rich peripheral countries, unskilled workers are relatively 
scarce. Wages should be – relatively – high. They frequently are not. Why? Again a 
historical excursion may be illuminating.
The Black Death and its consequences turned out to be a formative experience in 
European history also institutionally. The pandemic of the 1340s wiped out one-third 
to one-half of the population in almost all European countries. According to economic 
logic, this should have made labor scarce, at the latest when economic and social 
life gained momentum again in the decades after the catastrophic events. And it did, 
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but the consequences varied greatly between center and periphery in Europe. In the 
economic center of Europe, in the West, on or close to the areas of high population 
density and urbanization running from South Eastern England up the Rhine valley into 
northern Italy, we can observe the consequences one might have predicted: wages 
rose and feudal ties were loosened. In the East, the periphery, by way of contrast, 
feudal landholders managed to tighten their grip on rural labor – the so-called second 
serfdom began.
In other words: the same economic impulse ‒ labor scarcity ‒ influenced institutions in 
a strikingly different fashion. When theorizing the reasons, one account emphasizes 
how an initial difference is magnified by an economic impulse. Cities in the East were 
smaller and the city network less dense than in the West. Thus the “outside option” for 
agricultural laborers – leaving the countryside for the city ‒ was less attractive in the 
periphery compared to the center of the continent making it easier for the landed nobility 
to maintain their power even after the demographic shock of the Black Death: coercive 
measures or their threat were more likely to succeed when the alternative was less 
attractive. To sharpen the statement: Initial differences in economic and political power 
of the nobility were exacerbated by the negative demographic shock (see Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012: 96-101) for a popular account and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) 
for a more theoretical account).
What does this tell us about resource-rich countries? Where initial inequalities in 
economic resources, especially land ownership, political and military power among 
actors in an economy are sufficiently large, coercive labor relations in the form of 
slavery, serfdom or more modern forms possibly in need of identification are likely to 
prevail. Interpreting the above account using a frame of labor abundance vs. resource 
abundance, it looks as if these conditions are more likely to prevail in resource 
abundant conditions. Western Europe was more densely populated than the East, also 
in the countryside, and did have the denser city network. Relatively speaking, the East 
was less capital- and labor-abundant and more abundant in agricultural resources, 
particularly arable land. And it is there that labor scarcity generated more coercive 
labor arrangements. 
To wrap up the argument developed so far, once coercive labor relations have been 
established, the increase of demand for the final goods produced by this sector makes 
coercion even more worthwhile (cf. Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2011). Thus, if the potential 
export sector of a resource rich economy is characterized by coercive labor relations, 
integrating into the world economy makes coercion more attractive. Integrating into the 
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world economy under these conditions will therefore increase economic inequality and 
reinforce exploitative institutions.
This story can also be told with a macroeconomic twist. The more important foreign 
markets are to the profits of industry, the less important the macroeconomic link between 
high wages and high demand becomes, potentially limiting attempts to lower wages 
in an economy. In small open peripheries, the single firm logic, in which low wages 
always mean high profits, may then actually become the country logic, again making it 
more profitable to use repression to lower wages. Countries become so-called banana 
republics, basically run for private profit, frequently in the interest of foreign-owned 
firms (see also Section 4.3). 
And finally: One modern form of “coercion” could be unequal access to education. If 
lack of education makes people insecure in alien environments and immobile, both 
geographically and between economic occupations, then blocking the access to 
education has similar effects as the threat of violence: it makes outside options less 
attractive.
4.1.3 Same but Different – Abundance in Unskilled Labor
What is different in peripheral economies relatively abundant in unskilled labor? 
Little work has been done on this issue. Extending the discussion above, two lines 
of argument seem to support the hypothesis that we should find coercive labor 
arrangements less frequently here. First, coercion is less attractive in labor abundant 
countries – labor is cheap anyway. Second, coercion possibly is harder; more workers 
also mean potentially more resistance capability to coercive attempts. Of course, 
nothing in principle prevents ingenious divide-and-rule systems to be installed, as for 
example the Hindu caste system. Nevertheless, overall coercive labor seems less 
likely in labor abundant conditions.
What has been said above about the impact of trade on institutions does also apply 
here, mutatis mutandis. In labor-rich economies a rise in demand for labor intensive 
products should lead to a rise in wages – this however under weak institutional 
conditions makes it more attractive to actually use coercion against labor to avoid 
wage increases. Repression becomes more attractive. Thus, given a sufficiently strong 
international demand and a sufficiently large potential for repression, international 
trade may actually lead to repression where none had been before.
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4.1.4 Final Remarks
As to the effects of trade on distribution, we have so far relied on Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory. However, this framework clearly has its weaknesses. In a Heckscher-Ohlin world 
where markets are perfect and externalities and increasing returns to scale absent, 
trade is a great equalizer as developed in various theorems in international economics. 
As the so-called new economic geography has shown, allowing for agglomeration 
externalities may change this considerably. This will be discussed in a global, systemic 
perspective in Section 5.3. 
I am convinced that the applying this matrix of abundance of natural resources or 
labor, equality or inequality of economic and political resources, ease or difficulty 
of “grabbing”, as well as decreasing or increasing returns sectors of productions 
will provide a rich field of inquiry. It has already been shown that the notion of the 
development of underdevelopment – the notion of a vicious circle of peripherization 
pressure – can be fueled with analytical arguments from the field thus described. The 
discussion so far is summed up in Table 1.
Table 1: Trade and the Periphery (based on Heckscher-Ohlin Theory)



























• Grabbing becomes more profitable
• Increased demand for labor coercion
→ Increased 
concentration 
of income and 
political power
Ambiguous situation: movement 
possible towards both increased 
concentration of income and power as 
well as better enforcement of rights 
Source: Own elaboration
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4.2 Migration – Institutions, Brain Drain and Brain Gain
In a Heckscher-Ohlin world, for the country of origin, emigration has distributional 
effects equivalent to exports of products using the migrating factor intensively. Thus 
emigration of high-skilled workers should increase their wages at home, and thereby 
usually increasing inequality, while emigration of low skilled workers should increase 
the wages of low-skilled workers and decrease inequality.
There exists a long tradition challenging this prediction: Emigration from the Global 
South is a locus classicus of interaction between center and periphery which may lead 
to reinforcing or cumulative effects, virtuous or vicious circles. The critique of the brain 
drain has long argued that the best and most mobile people, those who are highly 
educated and entrepreneurial, are those who tend to leave the Global South. 
The highly educated may become more productive in the North due to a classic 
agglomeration effect central to the new economic geography approach (Venables 
2009). If people belonging to the so-called creative class are more productive when 
in an environment with others of the same type and these externalities are national in 
scope, then by free international movement of labor the key advantage of the center in 
science and technology will in fact be reinforced.
Similarly, those entrepreneurial enough to emigrate, whether highly educated or not, do 
not use their skills inside the Global South, but eventually, after a period of adaptation, 
contribute in the North. Even if we do not assume increasing returns to entrepreneurial 
skills, it is unlikely that this is a case of neo-classical diminishing returns. Only in this 
latter case will emigration be an equalizer of wage rates between North and South, like 
trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin case. 
As to income distribution: in both a so-called “new geography” world driven by 
knowledge externalities and a Heckscher-Ohlin world, income distribution in the 
North may become more unequal. In the first case due to an increasing productivity 
difference between the creative class and the rest, in the Heckscher-Ohlin world due 
to a decreasing wage level, if immigration is unskilled. Whether this might eventually 
destabilize the low inequality political economy present in the North remains an open 
question.
In both of the above cases, income distribution in the South should improve, thus 
also improving the political economy. However, the conceptual matrix introduced in the 
above paragraph also makes interaction more complex in the case of emigration. 
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An interesting issue in the case of a brain drain is that due to the diminishing size 
of the creative class network the return to education is reduced in the South. This 
results in a self-reinforcing effect of emigration of the best brains. With the option to 
become rich by educating oneself and creating technological advance in effect being 
exported by emigrating, education back home may at most be used to capture a good 
job in the relevant network of power. It thus may become easier to maintain a political 
regime guaranteeing high incomes by special privileges based on political power and 
restrictive access to education. 
This hypothesis does not seem to be too much off the mark. Historically, repressive 
regimes frequently have used emigration as a “safety valve” to stabilize their regimes, 
be it Wilhelmine Germany or Castro’s Cuba. Again there seems to be an effect of 
weak institutions. If emigration is an easy outside option for those likely to oppose 
repressive/grabbing type arrangements, these very arrangements may actually 
become entrenched by the possibility of emigration. 
Keeping institutions in mind, it can be seen that effects running in the opposite direction 
are also plausible. If outmigration is temporary or if emigrant communities remain in 
some type of contact with the population at home, they may well be the source of 
social and political ideas which eventually contribute to a change away from a regime 
benefitting only a narrow elite. The brain drain would then turn into a brain gain 
eventually. Note however that in all likelihood this would entail a temporal dimension 
with the brain gain setting in after a considerable time lag. This time lag would to some 
extent be absent if we look at technological and other types of operational knowledge 
which might be channeled to the country of origin by emigrants.
A final issue discussed in the literature in recent years is the issue of remittances by 
emigrants into their country of origin. Here we enter the field of financial flows which is 
the topic of the next section. 
4.3 Flows of Financial Capital – Increasing Inequality of Wealth and Power?
Discussion concerning the integration of countries into the international capital market 
has been quite heated. From the point of view of the present section, the key issue is 
once again to confront institutionalist narratives with the hypothesis of endogeneity, 
with a key interest in cumulative causation, i.e. vicious and virtuous circles.
Let us first return to the point at which international interactions influence institutions 
in the Acemoglu/Robinson framework – their influence on de facto political power via 
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the distribution of resources. Generally speaking, all foreign financial inflows represent 
a new reservoir for resources in the political game of a country. Foreign players 
become involved; sometimes via anonymous market forces when decision powers 
are dispersed, sometimes in an organized form, sometimes directly as players in the 
domestic game, sometimes indirectly as sources of power for domestic groups. As 
long as access to foreign financial resources is distributed unequally between domestic 
players, the domestic balance of de facto political power is influenced.
The distributional effect of financial openness is not discussed as frequently as the 
distributional effect of trade. However, it is not unfair to say that in general capital 
markets favor the well to do by enlarging their set of opportunities. This is clear in the 
case of bank credit, given the role collateral plays. In the case of stock and security 
markets, the key argument is based on transaction costs. As long as these have a large 
fixed component – direct monetary costs, fixed costs of obtaining knowledge about 
capital markets, or fixed costs of selling and buying – those bringing large financial 
resources to the capital market have an advantage over those who do not. Overall we 
should expect access to capital markets to sharpen distributional differences working 
in favor of the already well-off. The strength of the influence of access to international 
vs. national capital markets, however, remains an open question. 
So far, this narrative based on clearly defined and well-enforced property rights applies 
to both the Global North and South equally. However, given higher inequality in the 
South, it might as well push inequality beyond a critical value, making Acemoglu/
Robinson growth traps ‒ growth reducing policies supported by narrow elites ‒ more 
likely. 
When trying to come to grips with the impact of access to international capital markets 
on peripheral countries, however, it again seems promising to move the analysis into 
the world of weakly enforced rights where grabbing is easier. In order to do so, let us 
look at a narrative which comes across very much as an institutional trap perspective, 
a narrative Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff developed in the early 2000’s in 
several publications (Reinhart et al. 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004, 2009) centering 
on serial default and debt intolerance.
The story again is developed against the background hypothesis that access to capital 
markets is beneficial to countries. Reinhart and Rogoff observe that the critical level 
of foreign indebtedness (measured in debt to GDP ratios), at which foreign creditors 
become nervous and financial crises are likely, is a lot lower in peripheral countries in 
the Global South than in the countries of the North. They furthermore observe that once 
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countries have defaulted once, they are much more likely to default again (Reinhart et 
al. 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004, 2009). 
This might be explained in part by poor information on the part of international investors 
leading to very strong reputation effects – assuming that a country which has defaulted 
in recent history is likely to default again – leading to high interest rates and to default 
in a kind of self-fulfilling hypothesis.
However, in the present context, another narrative leads to a vicious circle fuelled 
by external finance. In this story, access to international capital markets opens up a 
new form of grabbing: While international credits to peripheral governments benefit 
the narrow elites disproportionately, they are paid back disproportionately by the 
disadvantaged poor: Financial crises tend to redistribute in reverse, from the poor to 
the rich. International credits then to some extent work like contracts at the expense of 
third parties – the non-elite sections of peripheral countries. They make political power 
more attractive and may draw more talent and effort into a reverse-redistributive state 
apparatus.
While this story is far from complete – it e.g. does not explain why the credit ceiling 
in the Global South is systematically lower than the credit ceiling in the Global North 
– it formulates a hypothesis why under what I call “grabbing conditions” international 
financial openness may actually be harmful for peripheral countries, entrenching re-
verse-redistributive and repressive regimes (see Rodrik 1999 for a related but distinct 
hypothesis).
Somewhat along the same lines, one can discuss foreign aid, especially in contexts 
where it is effectively the only access to international finance. Also in this case the 
foreign source of financial inflow may lead to an increase in grabbing activities, usually 
similar to the features described when discussing the natural resource curse ideas 
above (see e.g. Robinson and Torvik 2011). This may well be a non-intended effect. 
However, aid may also be willingly used as an instrument to support authoritarian 
governments.
When finally looking at foreign direct investment (FDI), the activities of multinational 
enterprises in the Global South introduce a new sort of player into the domestic 
struggle for de facto political power. It may be useful to distinguish horizontal FDI 
interested in selling goods in the country of investment from vertical FDI interested 
in producing goods for export. In the latter case, the interests of multinational firms in 
coercive labor arrangements are very similar to the ones described for national elites in 
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Section 4.1. If foreign interests become very dominant, regimes may actually become 
extremely negligent of the needs of their own populations because the sources of de 
facto political power are almost entirely foreign. Banana republics may be a case in 
point. The only limitation to repression is the assured flow of the natural and human 
resources needed. 
Horizontal FDI, by contrast, has an interest in domestic purchasing power. However, 
nothing prevents a situation in which the market for which a multinational firm is 
producing is based on the purchasing power of the privileged elite and middle classes, 
while still being interested in cheap labor for its production. In this case, FDI may fuel a 
divided society where a – sizable – minority uses repressive means against a majority 
which serves as cheap labor. Brazil in the 1970s may well be a good example for this 
kind of situation.
If we conclude that horizontal FDI in the Global North has no divisive effect, in some 
ways FDI may serve as an amplifier for a preexisting social and political matrix, 
enlarging whatever differences there might have been. However, with globalization, 
classical horizontal FDI has withered away considerably. More and more production is 
for the global market, wherever it might be located. The temptation for multinationals 
to press for lower wages has increased.
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Table 2: Financial Globalization and the Global South
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4.4 International Political Interaction 
The discussion on aid and foreign direct investment has brought us close to the 
discussion in the present section focusing on political interaction between a peripheral 
and a core country. Like in the case of aid and FDI, in political interaction, foreign 
resources available in the domestic struggle for de facto political power are controlled 
by organized entities. They can and have to be negotiated about. Indeed, the direction 
of foreign aid is frequently politically controlled and the interests of large multinationals 
influence the politics of the countries they originate from: The discussions above are 
also relevant here. 
Surely international political interaction encompasses not only financial aid and FDI. 
Adding political interaction extends the analysis productively. Fortunately, David Lake 
(Lake 2011) has initiated (or at least popularized and focused) a research program very 
compatible with the perspective of this paper. The main focus of his framework is an 
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analysis of what he calls international hierarchy, a state of affairs where a dominating 
country exercises authority over another, subordinate country. Authority is defined as 
the expectation that the subordinate country takes actions according to the wishes of 
the dominating country in certain policy areas if so desired by the dominating country. 
If the subordinated country does not comply, it is considered legitimate by both that 
the dominant country enforces compliance. In this way, subordinate states delegate 
sovereignty partially to dominant states (Lake 2011).
The benefit for the subordinate country is the provision of an “international order” by 
the dominant country. This order as such, understood as a set of rules in various policy 
areas, is quite plausibly a benefit for the subordinate country if compared with a state of 
international anarchy. Moreover, the dominant country bears a disproportionate share 
in the maintenance of that order, under which the subordinate country saves especially 
military expenses. They have to trade this off however both with the obedience they 
owe the dominant country and the fact that the dominant country will shape the rules 
of the international order so that they are particularly favorable to itself and not the 
subordinate countries. This ability to bend the rules in ones favor is an additional benefit 
of the dominant country (Lake 2011). 
This general framework becomes particularly relevant to this paper when Lake looks at 
the influence of international hierarchy on domestic distribution of power and resources 
and its dynamics in a recent paper (Lake 2012). His most relevant finding concerns 
the compatibility of foreign domination with democracy; in his case, domination by 
the US, but the argument is more general in character. The hypothesis he discusses: 
The larger the benefit from domination for the subordinate country and the closer the 
preference of the median voter in the subordinate country to the preferences of the 
dominant country, the more compatible is democracy with foreign domination. The 
smaller the gains, and the more distant the preferences of the median voter from the 
preferences of the dominant state, the more likely it is that foreign domination is only 
compatible with an autocracy (Lake 2012). 
Let us discuss the argument for a given level of gains from subordination. As the 
preference distance of the median voter increases from complete coincidence with 
the dominant state, at first he/she still is in favor of subordination. As preference 
distance increases, eventually the median voter will start to prefer full sovereignty to 
subordination. For some range she/he still can be compensated by those who gain from 
subordination, but eventually the only way to realize subordination is to disenfranchise 
those voters who object to subordination most. Authoritarian government therefore 
enters the picture. More generally, in Lake’s argument, subordination always becomes 
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cheaper if a smaller part of the population has to be compensated for the loss of 
sovereignty (Lake 2012). 
Lake remains agnostic about causation, arguing both that an authoritarian government, 
whose interest coincides broadly with the interests of the dominant state, will be more 
likely to seek the help of a dominant state and submerge itself into its hierarchy, as well 
as that foreign domination may create autocracies where none had been before (Lake 
2012). 
The approach of David Lake (2011, 2012) is highly compatible with the discussion 
up to this point and efforts to combine it with previous arguments could prove to be 
extremely fruitful. Indeed, Lake himself does relate some of the arguments made 
above on the winners and losers of trade under perfectly enforced property rights to 
his approach (Lake 2012: 18-19). Against a Heckscher-Ohlin background and arguing 
that the US-dominated global economic order favors free trade, he hypothesizes that 
the owners of abundant factors of production will be more in favor of US dominance 
than the owners of scarce factors of production (Lake 2012). This for example could 
contribute to an explanation of US dominance in Latin America. In Latin America the 
abundant factor is land and – autocratic – landowning elites are the historical allies of 
the US in that region.
When combining Lake’s framework with the above, two desiderata stand out. First: 
The median voter theorem is an overly reductionist framework for policymaking even 
in western representative democracies. Integrating interest group politics, e.g., would 
be most desirable. Second: When considering center-periphery relationships we have 
seen that integrating weak institutional arrangements, where grabbing activities are 
highly relevant, adds considerably to the analysis leading sometimes to conclusions 
contradicting the ones reached when rights are perfectly enforced. 
5. Towards a Gestalt Shift: An Institutional World System
So far I have explored an interactionist perspective of relating the political economy 
of Acemoglu and Robinson to a world system perspective, opening up the possibility 
that institutions, far from being exogenous, are decisively influenced by interactions 
between an economic and political center and a periphery. 
In the present section I will explore a completely different perspective. Essentially the 
idea is to view the entire world as a single institutional system, applying the insights 
gained from looking at national economies and societies to the world at large. Of 
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course, there exists no world state, and despite globalization social and economic 
interaction is still hampered by national borders. Nevertheless the following pages 
attempt to show that viewing the world system as an institutional system can provide a 
second original perspective relating the two paradigms in focus in this paper in a fertile 
fashion resulting in new perspectives on how national and international inequalities are 
entangled.
5.1 Korzeniewicz and Moran: Blending Acemoglu and Robinson and the 
 World System Approach
The idea of viewing the entire globe as an institutional system has been pioneered 
by Korzeniewicz and Moran (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). In Chapter 2 of their 
monograph, they base their approach on a critical reading and reinterpretation of the 
analyses of Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2005a) as well as Engerman 
and Sokoloff (2000). For the purpose of this paper, their key insight is the classification 
of national institutional equilibria into two categories: High Inequality Equilibria and 
Low Inequality Equilibria (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). 
High Inequality Equilibria (HIE) are characterized by highly unequal access to the means 
of production based largely on ascriptive characteristics, frequently based on descent 
(“race”). The selective exclusion (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009: 26) of large sectors 
of the population from political and educational opportunities as well as from the more 
profitable employment opportunities is the key to understanding these configurations. 
In the center of HIE are institutions establishing various forms of coercive labor. In the 
eyes of Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009), they are institutional innovations, varieties of 
capitalist economies, serving well the interests of the privileged few and the colonial 
powers they in turn serve. 
Low Inequality Equilibria (LIE) historically had been marginal areas, abundant in land, 
where population was scarce. Access to resources had been more equally distributed 
even initially, a result reinforced by slow and uneven processes of democratization 
over the last two centuries. In these slow, uneven and conflictual processes, more and 
more positions and resources have come to be assigned by achievement rather than 
by ascription. Today these are the (original) OECD countries which have outperformed 
the countries characterized by high inequality equilibria in terms of per capita income 
by far, over the last two centuries as well as today.
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Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) see these two configurations as dynamic historical 
equilibria. Forces are at work which reproduce their high or low inequality characteristics 
even as social, economic and technological circumstances change.
Based on this dichotomous characterization of national institutional configurations 
which imply two easily distinguishable inequality regimes, from the point of view of this 
section the decisive intellectual step is presented in Chapter 4 of Korzeniewicz and 
Moran (2009): Now the world system is interpreted as being a HIE. The main criteria of 
exclusion on a worldwide scale is seen in a modern ascriptive criterion, citizenship, and 
the main mechanism of exclusion today are the immigration policies in place, which 
only allow for selective access to the privileged conditions of the HIE countries. Thus, 
according to Korzeniewicz and Moran, the same processes which reduce competition 
within the HIE countries enhance competitive pressures in the LIE to the detriment of 
the excluded (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009: 78).
Beyond pioneering this highly original fusion of institutional and world system 
approaches into something they call a world-historical perspective, Korzeniewicz and 
Moran impress with extensive empirical material on the world income distribution at 
several points in time, carefully blending national and world inequality into one overall 
picture. 
Their study of migration regimes is another strength of their analysis. While this is 
an important exclusionary mechanism in place, I would argue that it should not be 
considered as the main mechanism (although Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009: 82 seem 
to imply this). Selective protectionism by the countries of the center against the import 
of labor intensive products of the periphery is for example equivalent to restrictive 
migration policies: trade is a substitute for factor migration under Heckscher-Ohlin 
conditions. A complete picture of the relevant exclusion mechanisms should cover all 
the types of interaction looked at in Section 4.
Another problem with their analysis is that the core of their analysis suffers from the 
same macro-regional bias as the literature Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) cite: They 
all take their inspiration very much from the two Americas, and to a considerable but 
lesser extent from Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, while the mechanisms described 
were very important in these contexts, they had a considerably lesser impact in the 
Middle East or Asia. Thus a more differentiated analysis of the Global South, or indeed 
much more specific national or sub-national case studies would be of great interest.
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Furthermore, the role of competition is ambivalent. While considering the coercive labor 
arrangements created by European colonial powers as institutional Schumpeterian 
innovations, competition in itself seems to be largely seen as an element adverse to 
a high income, and arrangements limiting competition as essential for achieving high 
income. Competition appears to be limited to competition over a cake of a given size, 
while the wealth-creating elements of competition are overlooked. Here again a more 
differentiated and systematic account may add to the strength of the analysis.
Also an analogous issue stressed by Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 
2005a), the development trap caused by unequal distribution, is not developed by 
Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) when interpreting the world as a HIE. Applying it leads 
to the hypotheses that high worldwide inequality creates a global development trap in 
which the global center may actually try to block development in the periphery due to 
the fear of obtaining too little of the enlarged share created in a more egalitarian and 
richer world. 
Especially when looking at this last hypothesis, conceptualizing the center as a 
unitary actor, as the transfer of the Acemoglu and Robinson political economy implies, 
appears to be seriously limiting. To some extent this is remedied by yet another new 
institutionalist account of world development to which we now turn. 
5.2 Global Elite Coalitions and Organized Violence ‒ Reading North, Wallis  
 and Weingast Against the Grain 
“Violence and Social Orders” (North et al. 2009) can be considered a conservative 
answer to the vision provided by the research program of Acemoglu and Robinson 
(e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2005a). Just as the latter, it has had considerable impact, the 
monograph having been translated into Chinese, French, German, Italian, Japanese 
and Russian. It has entered the academic discussion on economic development and 
has entered into World Bank discourse (see North et al. 2013). 
Like Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2005a), it focusses on inequality of 
resources, adding resources of organized violence to the political and the economic. 
Even more than the Acemoglu and Robinson approach, it concentrates almost entirely 
on a comparative institutional exercise. It is illuminating in its own right, both for its 
achievements and for the issues it does not tackle. It is also instructive to view the 
entire globe from the point of view of this perspective just as Korzeniewicz and Moran 
(2009) have done based on the Acemoglu and Robinson approach.
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5.2.1 Two Institutional Equilibria to Control the Threat of Violence in Human   
 Societies
Just like for Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009), the fundamental conceptual framework 
of North, Wallis and Weingast is dichotomous. It is presented as two distinct social 
orders which have developed over historical time. The central task of these social 
orders: limiting the incidence of violence in human societies. Throughout most of 
human history ever since the initial appearance of cities, this has been attempted by 
what North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) originally call the natural state. More recently 
they have shifted to the term limited access order (LAO). Only during the course of 
the last two centuries, a few countries, the original OECD countries, have managed 
to transform their institutional setup into open access orders (OAO) (North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009). Let us briefly look at the two in turn. 
The key mechanism by which violence is contained in a LAO is very similar to an 
efficiency wage mechanism. The rents generated through the cooperation by those 
who control the resources for violence exceed any expected gains from using violence. 
Thus natural states are controlled by elite coalitions of actors able to exert considerable 
command over violence. Their immediate “profession” might be military, but also 
economic, political or indeed ideological/cultural (educators, holders of religious office). 
Ultimately however the effective power of a grouping is based on its command of 
organized violence: directly, by financing it, by legitimizing it, or by negotiating deals 
with the threat of violence in the background. 
Peace among those at the top of these groups controlling organized violence, so the 
argument of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), allows them to carve up their world, 
limiting access to key economic and political resources by their command of organized 
violence. The same instruments of violence serving as a threat in the bargain against 
other members of the elite coalition are used to extract resources from the followers 
of one’s own grouping, by threat or by use. In the slowly growing societies of most of 
human history, indeed this has been the central key to economic inequality (North, 
Wallis and Weingast 2009). 
This then is the key mechanism: unequal command over organized violence requires 
unequal distribution of income and economic resources. The internal peace dividend 
of a society has to flow to those whose command over organized violence makes them 
powerful in order to keep them from demanding their disproportionate share violently. 
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This argument looks essentially Hobbesian. A Leviathan guaranteeing internal peace 
will only come into existence if its components do not gain by challenging the distribution 
of resources given at any point in time. The alternative to the exploitative Leviathan is 
anarchy.
The rents generated by limiting access to political, cultural and economic resources will 
be used partially to distribute them to non-elite members of the respective groupings 
in exchange for loyal service: feudal systems, systems selling state offices, patron-
client networks, etc. Over the course of time the identity of those belonging to the elite 
may change, both individually and as to the groups being represented, as access of 
individuals and groups to the means of violence changes. 
The key to understand an OAO is the institutionalized civil control of organized violence, 
the military and the police. In a historically unlikely fashion, societies characterized by 
OAOs have managed to compartmentalize violence. The Weberian ideal is reached: 
the state monopolizes violence and that state is controlled by civilians. This is, in the 
eyes of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), a fundamental departure from the conditions 
in an LAO. In a LAO, access to the means of violence is practically open, while access 
to economic and political resources is limited. In the ideal OAO access to political and 
economic power is open, while access to organized violence is highly restricted. Key to 
this is the separation of the control of how to wage war by the military from the control 
of the political decisions of when to wage war and how to finance it, which are reserved 
for the civilian state organization (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). 
In the ideal type of an OAO, organizations are what North, Wallis and Weingast label 
“perpetually lived”: they have potentially an eternal life, independent of the people 
running them: They have become depersonalized entities. The rule of law is accessible 
to everybody and so is the right to organize privately or politically. Enforcement of 
agreements and contracts by third parties is at least in principle available to all too. 
Politics is competitive and characterized by free entry, as are economic activities. 
This has important effects: A vibrant civil society controls politics and economics, and 
economic rents are mostly generated by technological innovations.
LAOs, by contrast, according to North, Wallis and Weingast, come in three distinct 
varieties, fragile, basic and mature. In fragile natural states, relationships within the 
elite coalition and within the groupings commanded by the members of the elite are 
highly personalized. There is no permanent state organization. In basic LAOs, some 
state organization appears, but is not yet independent of the personal identities of 
those in the ruling coalition, while in mature LAOs a perpetual state organization exists 
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independent of the personal identities of those in power. Furthermore, it is possible for 
elite members to form private organizations independent of the state to some limited 
extent. While this clearly describes an upward gradient to more and more stable state 
organization, the authors emphasize that no dynamics necessarily drive a society 
along the road thus laid out. Reversals to a more rudimentary form of an LAO do occur. 
The change from a limited access order to an open access order is considered 
fundamental by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) and in their view at least so far has 
been irreversible. They name three doorstep conditions necessary for a change to an 
OAO to be possible (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009: 11): 
• rule of law for the elite,
• perpetually lived organizations in the public and the private sphere,
• consolidated political control of the military.
The change itself takes place when the rights so far reserved for the elite are granted 
to ever larger parts of the rest of the society.
5.2.2 Discussion – Bringing Initial Distribution and Collective Action Back in
When critically assessing the above, it is all too obvious that this is a modernization 
type of narrative describing historical stages leading to the OAO by which rich countries 
are characterized. The unit of analysis is the (nation) state and internal conditions are 
key to how history progresses. This key failing of all the institutional accounts from the 
point of view of this paper will be discussed in the next section. The present section is 
devoted to a discussion of the approach in its own right. I think both achievements and 
omissions are considerable.
The first clear achievement of this approach is its focus on violence and its prevention 
in human societies, which had been largely absent in previous institutionalist accounts. 
A second theoretical innovation is the key ingredient of the concept of the LAO: the 
– at least temporal – stabilization of peace through cooperation with rents being 
appropriated by potentially violent elites. And lastly, the argument that the regulation of 
intra-elite relations by the law, using perpetually lived organizations, is a precondition 
for the transformation of an LAO into an OAO is interesting. In some sense it echoes 
the proposition that revolutionary change presupposes an idea of how to change a 
social or political order: A credible idea of how things could be done differently. Periodic 
peasant uprisings are a persistent feature in traditional societies – and it has been 
argued that they tend to be persistently unsuccessful due to the lack of an alternative 
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vision for political organization: Looking for “the good king” instead of trying to abolish 
feudalism.  
Conspicuously absent from the account of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) is a 
discussion of socio-economic inequality prior to and independent of the command of 
organized violence and how it might influence the trajectory of a society. The control of 
the means of violence by an elite in a grouping is taken for granted. This is fundamental. 
In the logic of the North, Wallis, Weingast (2009) argument, anybody can claim to be 
part of the ruling coalition who credibly shows a potential for violent intervention – 
the control of economic resources and military technology being arguably the most 
important ingredients of this capability. Thus how access to both is distributed in a society 
might be essential for the course of a society by determining the costs of conflict, the 
abilities of different groupings in society to organize defensive and offensive potential 
of violence, etc. 
It is probably not a historical accident that low inequality/open access societies have 
developed out of societies at the margins of empires, ancient or more recent, where 
the armed arm of the respective centers was weak from the beginning or became weak 
early when imperial overstretch set in. Elites or their cronies were relatively few and the 
centralized instruments of violence limited to enforce the type of hierarchical system 
from which the logics of a LAO may grow. 
Very much along the same line of argument, the role of conflict to achieve an OAO 
is very much downplayed (cf. North et al. 2009: 245). Elites do not just give up their 
privileges: they do so only if faced with a sufficiently strong threat. How this may 
come about is of course a research area of its own with both a long tradition and 
a lot of open questions. It is probably not a historical accident that greater equality 
was achieved when conscription armies were considered to be the most successful 
military technology (and barricades were a promising means of street fighting) giving 
the disenfranchised some leverage also due to their importance for military success. 
Let us use all of the above to rephrase the North, Wallis, Weingast account. Phrased 
very generally (and almost a truism): violent conflict in a society will break out when 
groups commanding some resources of organized violence have reasons to believe 
that this will be to their advantage. This is the more likely if the costs of doing so are 
low and the expected gains high.
More specifically, the LAO argument sees control of organized violence concentrated 
in the hands of an elite. If we go along with this, intra-elite conflict is unlikely if conflict 
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would destroy the very spoils a group wants to obtain a larger share of – e.g. by 
producing anarchy, by doing long-term damage to the economy or by sparking 
a revolution. However, if access to organized means of violence is more equally 
distributed in society, if larger sections of society become able to resist in a conflict, or 
if costs of repression rise (e.g. due to large distance between center and periphery), 
the resulting distribution of economic resources will become more egalitarian as well. 
The very ability to organize, i.e. to overcome group-specific collective action problems, 
or in yet other words, to overcome divide-and-rule strategies employed by the elite, 
may be a central part of this. 
On an even more fundamental note: If the LAO framework contests that military power 
yields economic power via the extraction of rents from the powerless, does not the 
disposition over military power itself presuppose economic power? How circular is this 
argument? 
What finally remains entirely unclear in this approach is why this argument should only 
work with rents obtained from extracting surplus by the poor masses and giving it to the 
potentially violent few. Peaceful cooperation of the potentially violent few avoids the 
destruction of rents, in conflict and its aftermath. If rents are generated by repression 
this may be the case, when conflict may lead to an egalitarian revolution or, more likely, 
a complete replacement of one elite by another. However, if income of the potentially 
violent few is high because they can tax a thriving capitalist economy, then the peaceful 
cooperation of the potentially violent few is even more likely since complex economies 
suffer even more from organized internal violence than less complex ones. If this is so, 
it is not clear why societies should necessarily be trapped in an LAO, since even elites 
in LAO could perceive the potential benefits of moving beyond it. Here the Acemoglu 
and Robinson approach may help.
Overall, decomposing the elite of Acemoglu-Robinson into an elite coalition is certainly 
an important advance, and the efficiency-wage hypothesis of stabilization of peace as 
well as the idea of institutional preconditions for a change to an OAO are both worth 
exploring. Nevertheless, the relationship between inequality in the access to economic 
resources and inequality in the disposition over resources of organized violence does 
seem to be in need of further inquiry. For doing so it could be worthwhile to attempt a 
synthesis of the frameworks of North, Wallis and Weingast and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(especially Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
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5.3 The World, a Limited Access Order? Coalitions, Units of Analysis and  
 Mechanisms of Exclusion
After having discussed achievements and omissions of the Limited Access Order/Open 
Access Order (LAO/OAO) framework of North, Wallis and Weingast on its original turf, 
the country, this section now turns to its relevance when considering the idea of looking 
at the entire globe as an Institutional World System as developed in Section 5.1.
Analogous to the Korzeniewicz and Moran move which turned a Global South aspiring 
to become like the Global North in terms of inequality into a Global South excluded in 
a global high inequality regime, applying the LAO/OAO framework to the entire world 
turns the Global South from LAOs which ought to transform themselves into an OAO 
into the subordinate followers in some global grouping lead by some in the North who 
wield globally relevant means of violence in a global LAO.
Just as in a national context, the LAO/OAO framework has the advantage to allow 
for a consistent discussion of intra-elite conflicts. Interesting in this perspective – as a 
hypothesis – is the importance of possessing relevant means of organized violence as 
sources of power. The world as a LAO implies stability being assured by elites having 
access to rents from peace larger than any spoils from war. These rents are generated 
by limiting the access of the Global South to key economic resources – following the 
LAO narrative. If this sounds somewhere between neo-feudalism and neo-imperialism, 
so it should. 
Whether the globe today is best described as analogous to a fragile, basic or mature 
LAO is not uninteresting. It strikes the eye that the establishment of some global 
institutions via the UN System after World War Two could be interpreted as a move 
from a fragile towards a basic LAO or even a mature one, given the independence 
of these organizations from personal relationships and the ease of action for elite 
organizations outside the “state” (= the UN organizational framework): Multinational 
companies, regional integration agreements, NGO’s, the Davos meetings, etc. This 
compares with a pre-1914 framework where personal relationships between monarchs 
were deemed important by contemporary observers at the eve of World War One. 
At this point the question arises: who actually constitutes the ruling coalition on a global 
scale if one would apply the LAO/OAO framework? Early after World War Two, one 
would probably have started easily with a state-centered account, dominated by the 
then-undisputed hegemon United States at the top of an international hierarchy both 
along the lines described by David Lake (2011, 2012) and discussed in Section 4.4 and 
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the rapidly dissolving remnants of old-style imperialism. Today a modified description 
should emphasize the rise of large transnational enterprises, and would consist of 
a partially competitive, partially cooperative network. For this to make sense for a 
global LAO/OAO approach, one would have to include a description of how states and 
transnational enterprises coalesce in directing the use of the potential for organized 
violence by states.
On a national level this idea has been a major element of our reading of the world 
systems approach in Section 3. It is also part of the comparative capitalisms approach 
of Bruno Amable (2003). Basically, certain political power constellations will create 
economic institutions in their interests. These then encourage economic decisions by 
many actors adapting to these institutions, creating new interests ready to organize in 
order to defend and adapt them in the light of new challenges. It would be interesting to 
look at similar mechanisms around a new highly educated, mobile and connected class 
of executives relatively high up in the decision-making hierarchy of this government-
transnational complex. NGOs could be seen as a global counter elite, torn between 
being a true challenge to the established powers and being co-opted. To analyze 
all this, network and Bourdieu-type of analyses of economic and cultural capital of 
these elites may be very interesting, particularly to assess the degree to which these 
institutions have become more like perpetually lived organizations than purely personal 
connections.
Around this narrow core elite we then have those who have been “bribed” into the elite, 
who have something to lose from a change in the dominant coalition or indeed the 
global hierarchy as such. Skilled workers in the Global North are a case in point. So 
are the current state elites in the Global South.  
A very important issue in such a narrative is the relationship between direct forms of 
hierarchy and indirect, more or less anonymous forces of exclusion. More on the direct 
hierarchy side is the Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) argument about exclusion via 
citizenship. However, citizenship only becomes a relevant means for exclusion when 
the dynamics in the world system maintain the center-periphery gap at the level of 
countries.
Section 4 below worked out several hypotheses which would qualify as indirect forces 
here. However, I would like to focus on one set of such arguments not discussed thus 
far: the so called “New Economic Geography” (see Venables 2009 for an account 
emphasizing development issues). In the world imagined by this branch of economic 
thinking, both externalities and increasing returns are introduced and thus it becomes 
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possible that a reduction of trade barriers between (a commodity producing) periphery 
and (an industrialized) center may lead to a reduction of welfare in the periphery. The 
mechanism is easily explained: Due to the reduced costs of overcoming the distance 
between center and periphery in combination with economies of scale in “manufacturing” 
it may become more profitable to concentrate manufacturing production in the center 
and deliver industrial goods into the periphery via trade rather than produce them 
locally. Trade leads to deindustrialization. This will reduce welfare in the periphery if 
agglomeration externalities in manufacturing are strong enough and monopoly rents 
earned there are high. 
However, the “New Economic Geography” approach (e.g. Venables 2009) can also 
be used to support an interesting alternative to citizenship as a major mechanism 
of exclusion: the idea that exclusion works mainly via limited access to education. 
Education is the only means by which individuals are able to obtain the appropriate 
cognitive mindset (cultural capital) which enables them to become part of the global 
elite network. 
Frequently it has been argued that agglomeration effects are particularly strong in 
innovative, knowledge-intensive industries: Knowledge production in both theoretical 
and applied forms becomes more productive if in close spatial contract with other 
knowledge production. If this is the case, education opens or closes doors to an 
important sector of a modern economy with increasing returns to scale, creating major 
inequalities in income between those in the network who benefit from the externalities 
and those who are excluded. Whether externalities travel by pure spatial proximity 
or network proximity and whether network proximity is national, organizational 
(transnational companies) or international is an interesting question. It recently has 
been fueled by large corporations locating their R&D departments no longer merely 
close to headquarters, in center countries, but more and more distributed in a worldwide 
network, including major semiperipheral states.
In some ways, access to global knowledge networks and the education opening the 
doors to enter them has therefore become similar to another major structural exclusion 
effect hypothesized to be present in global financial markets. It has been very succinctly 
dubbed “original sin” by Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann and Ugo Panizza 
(see Hausmann and Panizza 2011 for a recent discussion by two of the three original 
authors) and refers to the problems generated by the Global South not being able to 
borrow internationally in national currency. When the going gets rough in an economy, 
its currency tends to weaken. If the country is indebted in a foreign currency, the debt 
burden rises relative to domestic economic capacity, making it more difficult to service 
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external debt at the very time when domestic capacity to do so is enfeebled anyway. 
This makes external debt riskier, policymakers less able to run counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies, and increases the overall instability of economies in the Global South. 
In contrast to the debt intolerance literature discussed in Section 4.3, the original sin 
hypothesis sees the problem in the structures of the global financial markets, and not 
in the institutional weakness present in the Global South (see Eichengreen et al. 2007 
for a discussion). Essentially, the appetite of global investors to diversify their portfolios 
is limited on the one hand due to the transaction costs associated with handling 
additional currencies in the portfolio and on the other hand due to declining benefits 
of diversification as more and more currencies are added. As a result, the optimal 
currency portfolio has a limited number of currencies. Big countries have advantages 
due to the internal diversification they provide by offering an already well-diversified 
set of economic activities to invest in. Also for trade, network effects play into the 
hands of a handful of major currencies as carrier currencies. Eichengreen, Hausmann 
and Panizza (2011) do not deny that institutional weakness might have an effect, but 
neither does it seem robust nor strong. The gist of the analysis: There is only space 
for a few currencies in the portfolios of global finance and the big economies of the 
Global North sit relatively comfortably in their respective slots. As a consequence, the 
Global South is cut off from the capital flows which could generate a welfare gain and 
especially help to stabilize national economies. 
A fourth possible structural exclusion mechanism has a very similar effect. Ever since 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, specialization in the export of a very limited set of 
natural resources has been criticized heavily. Recently Jeffrey Williamson (2011) has 
prominently argued that the main cause for detrimental effects of entering the global 
division of labor as a natural resource exporting country are not long term price trends 
– even though they may well contribute – but the volatility of commodity prices. 
Thus, both original sin and specialization in a small set of natural resource exports 
puts economies in the Global South under the increased strain of a highly volatile 
economic environment. Clearly these fiscal and economic challenges demand more of 
institutionally weaker governance structures in the South than from the stable ones in 
the North. Whether it actually does lead to a vicious circle of institutional deterioration 
in the South and a symmetric virtuous circle in the North is a very interesting research 
question.
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Table 3: The World as a Global Limited Access Order
The World as a Limited Access Order: Key Research Questions
Character of the global LAO: Basic or mature? 
• Key issues: the role and character of global intergovernmental institutions, 
multinational cooperation and global NGOs
Character of global elite coalition: A coalition of states or a network of state, business 
and cultural elites or some composite?
Exploration of mechanisms of limited access/exclusion on a global scale:
• Migration and citizenship
• Global networks in the presence of positive network externalities and differential 
access to education
• Financial flows and “original sin”
• Trade and the volatility of commodity prices
Source: Own elaboration
What is the significance of these anonymous mechanisms to which we can add those 
discussed in Section 4 based on the impact of international economic interaction on 
national distribution of resources? I think this is most readily understood by referring 
back to the work of David Lake on international hierarchy discussed in Section 4.4. The 
dominant state he refers to is the United States, and the international order which is 
provided is the liberal economic order. If the mechanisms described above and in Section 
4 are relevant and dominant, and if all these different virtuous and vicious circles cut 
at the same point in the socio-economic continuum, then in this liberal economic order 
there will be a tendency towards the development of underdevelopment. This then 
provides a reason why the median voter in the Global South has voting preferences 
opposed to those of the US hegemon and why thus US dominance in the Global 
South has had the tendency to be associated with the support of autocratic regimes as 
hypothesized in (Lake 2012).
The question left open on this level is whether this is a necessary consequence of a 
liberal economic order or not. Avenues in which unequal interaction stabilizes global 
inequalities have been described. However, nothing in the arguments generated so far 
presupposes that the capitalist market economy would not thrive when all countries 
had their share of technological leadership in stable political and economic conditions. 
Center and periphery may be but one possible configuration of a capitalist world 
economy characterized by multiple stable political economic configurations. 
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But have we already reconstructed the globe as an Institutional World System, a global 
limited access order? No, we have not. The story up to this point has once again turned 
out to be a story with a single peaked hierarchy, describing at best one of the groups 
commanding organized violence on the global scale, but not the global coalition – if 
there should be one. Yes, the global executive elite could be part of such a coalition. 
But it does not command organized violence comparable to countries. In order to get 
one step further, we need to step back and ask whether we have grasped the ideas of 
center and periphery sufficiently yet.   
6. Center and Periphery: Bringing Space Back in
6.1 Conceptual Reflections
When looking at the journey covered so far in this paper, one issue is striking: the 
absence of any explicit consideration of geographical space, even though some issues 
have of course been part of the discussion so far. In this section I will remedy this 
somewhat by systematically probing into the concepts of center and periphery. 
At a very general level I propose to understand the spatial differentiation of center 
and periphery as a spatial expression of a hierarchy. One immediate consequence: 
Center and periphery become a continuum where spaces closer to the center end of 
the continuum are higher up in the hierarchy and spaces closer to the periphery end 
are lower down. This has a corollary: The more center-like an activity, a place, an 
interaction, the greater is its spatial reach. Or, more succinctly: A place is the higher up 
in the center-periphery hierarchy the larger is the spatial reach of the choices made in it 
and the less it is subject to decisions taken elsewhere. Whether we measure space by 
distance or territory or rather by number of people – or, how the interaction of the two 
is in itself a sign of centeredness ‒ is an interesting issue I shall bypass here.
While the focus on choices/decisions might be due to the author being an economist, 
it most easily fits for the political dimension considered so far. Within states it is clear 
that decisions taken by a national government, laws passed by national parliaments, 
and cases decided by a supreme court determine (often central) aspects of life in the 
entire country. The decisions taken by federal states – should they exist – in provinces 
or in local communes have less spatial impact. Insofar as a country is a subordinate 
part of an international hierarchy or otherwise influenced by other powerful states (see 
the discussion of the ideas of David Lake in Section 4.4 above) there are other centers 
which are hierarchically superior – at least in some dimensions.
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The more different dimensions of state decisions are concentrated in the same space, 
the more “centered” is political life in a state. Thus a supreme court might be in the 
capital or it might not be. Less frequently, parliament and government might not be 
situated in the same city, ministerial bureaucracies might be spatially concentrated or 
not. At the extreme, all decisions taken for the entire territory of a state are taken in the 
same city. 
Obviously, if we want to analyze the reach of a political center, it also matters how deep 
national political decisions, or for that matter, any decisions, interfere with interactions 
within its territorial reach. Analogous to the concepts introduced by Michael Mann 
(2012), let us define the spatial reach of a center as its extensive reach and the depth 
of interference as the intensive reach of a center. 
All this seems to work quite well in the political sphere, but how about in the economy? 
Where economic choices are made inside organizations, little is changed. Strategic 
decisions taken in the headquarters of a large multinational have both a large extensive 
and possibly also a large intensive reach. Headquarters of enterprises tend to locate 
in major cities and indeed, without them, the centrality of a city is considered to be 
lacking. But what about markets? They can be spatially decentralized, even diffuse. 
But especially financial markets like stock exchanges tend to be concentrated spatially 
and here indeed major decisions are taken by market participants and aggregated in 
the markets themselves (and major actors in financial markets tend to concentrate 
headquarters in those locations). 
More systematically, looked at from economics, the concept of economies of scale 
(and scope) has been traditionally used to explain the concentration of production in 
one specific location. It is cheaper to locate a large output of the same product (or the 
output of many products) in one location and serve a large market area from it rather 
than disperse production in different locations. The concepts come in two varieties: 
internal economies require the concentration in one location and one firm, external 
economies in one location, but not in one firm (economies of agglomeration, see also 
the discussion in the previous section). The distinction is analytical of course and the 
phenomena do mix in practice. Analyzing them has been the turf of the sub-discipline 
of economic geography. 
From the point of view of the present discussion, it is decisive that all these varieties 
of economies of scale and scope lead to the spatial concentration of (production, 
marketing, R&D, etc.) decisions in one geographic space from which they then affect 
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the market area served from this location directly or indirectly (product design decisions 
taken in A and realized in B, C, D from where they are distributed in space). 
This is even true in the sphere of wholesale and retail trade. The specialist shop 
located in a metropolitan city serves a large market area and – at least in the pre-
internet age – consumers make their one-time choices concerning this special need in 
this location. This shop is located there because other special needs shops are also 
located there: consumers go there to satisfy their occasional needs in one trip and visit 
other specialist shops too. Here they also find the department stores with the greatest 
variety of goods and can enjoy cultural events they consume only once in a while (a 
type of agglomeration economy of scope).
In the economic sphere, the intensive reach of decisions concerns the economic 
importance of the goods affected. A specialist firm serving a large market for specialist 
consumer needs has a large extensive reach, but little intensive reach. By way of 
contrast, the world’s financial centers combine large extensive with large intensive 
reach. 
Thus the conceptualization of center-periphery as hierarchy in space and of centricity 
as a combination of spatial, extensive reach and of intensive reach of decisions taken 
in a certain location seems to work out well in economics and politics. But it could also 
be that centricity is not limited to economics and politics. 
The Norwegian Stein Rokkan, on the sidelines of his efforts to understand the course 
and fate of democratization in Europe (cf. Rokkan 2000: 138-170), has developed a 
four-dimensional model of center-periphery relations, discussing Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Perry Anderson, Talcott Parsons and Albert Hirschman, among others, along the way. 
He adds the military and the cultural dimensions to the economic and the political. The 
earlier discussion concerning the political sphere can be transferred to the military 
without difficulties. As the social field of organized violence it is overall more centrally 
organized. It is, moreover, especially closely connected to the political sphere.4 
The cultural sphere tends to be less centrally organized. Clearly, also in the cultural 
sphere some fields are populated by hierarchical organizations like churches and 
firms, where much of the earlier discussion applies without difficulties. However, in 
4 Rokkan (2000) is a systematic compilation of the theoretical core of Stein Rokkan’s work by the 
German sociologist Peter Flora. In as far as this is to be taken at face value, it appears that in earlier 
versions of his theoretical thinking, Rokkan had merged the military and the political dimensions into 
a single military-administrative one (cf. Rokkan 2000: 138-170). This seems to be a more general 
issue. See e.g. the discussion about Michael Mann’s four sources of power ‒ political, military, 
economic and ideological (see Hall and Schroeder 2006). 
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the cultural field much of the influence of a center is not by command and control but 
rather by diffusion of a trend, a fashion, an idea from creative centers into receptive 
peripheries. Thus, choices about fashion made in Paris, Milan or New York have a far 
greater extensive reach than fashion choices made in other locations.
6.2 The Institutional World System Revisited
The conceptual reflections of the last section make it possible to raise a few issues not 
considered so far: issues that relate hierarchy to space. 
The first one is almost trivial, but nevertheless important. There is nothing in the logic 
of center and periphery that makes it necessary for geographical space to be taken up 
seamlessly by systems of centers and periphery. There might be empty spaces which 
fall in between the extensive reach of any center of a particular type in a specific period 
of time. Is this a benefit or a curse? With reference to history, this debate is indeed 
core of the seminal article “Reversal of Fortune” by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002), pointing out that those Latin American countries not penetrated 
deeply by the colonizing powers later had a considerable advantage over the deeply 
penetrated centers due to the lesser grip of the exploitative institutions that had been 
installed. 
In an interesting further differentiation of this story, the historian James Mahoney (2010) 
has argued, again analyzing Latin America, that the effect of colonization depends 
on the kind of regime in place – being more or less left out of a mercantilist system, 
he claims, is an advantage, while being left out of a liberal regime a disadvantage. 
While intensive mercantilist colonization establishes a strong landowning class whose 
power is detrimental to later economic development, strong liberal colonial penetration 
creates a strong commercial class supporting further economic development. Thus, 
in this narrative, not only does the same type of regime, the same type of institutions, 
affect centers, peripheries, and peripheries of peripheries differently, but different type 
of regimes and the hierarchies they create again have different spatial institutional 
effects. Thus under some conditions, being in the outback of a hierarchical socio-
economic system creates conditions under which a new center may rise, sometimes 
not; an obvious area for further research. 
A second, related, idea results from the realization that in a world of countries ‒ as the 
prime sources of organized violence in one way or the other central elements of the 
ruling coalition in the center of the global system ‒ lines of disputed loyalties between 
different groups in the coalition become geographical areas, contested areas. How 
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does this status of being contested terrain affect a state? Can it benefit from playing the 
interested powers off against each other? Or will it be torn apart in the process (divided 
or thrown back by a civil war fought by parties with diverging international support). 
Third: All of the conceptual points made so far can interact to create multifaceted 
landscapes generating a multitude of entangled dynamics. Cultural multicentricity 
may go hand in hand with political and military monocentricity. An economic center of 
great reach may be dominated politically. A location might be a political periphery in a 
country but right in the middle of the economic center of a larger region. And so on. The 
combinatorial possibilities are immense. 
One example of an attempt to systematically map such a landscape in order to analyze 
one specific issue is the work of Stein Rokkan himself. When trying to explain the distinct 
political dynamics of different European states from the early times of nation-building 
up to the fate of democracy in the 20th century, he traced the dynamics of center-
periphery relations in the four dimensions both on a national and a European scale. 
Thus he for example explains how the political clout of cities in most of the economic 
center of Europe (the so called “Blue Banana” reaching from London across Belgium 
and the Netherlands along the Rhine across the Alps to Northern Italy) contributed to 
the slow speed of state building in this region. And cities of course were strong there 
because this was the economic center of the continent. 
Similarly, it has been argued that the European dynamic of the last millennium was at 
least partially due to (stable) political and military multicentricity, also in its economic 
center, combined with cultural homogeneity and shifting cultural centers. 
Returning to some of the issues raised so far in Sections 5 and in this section, one 
might add: Does it influence the character of center-periphery relations if the dominating 
country is more or less hierarchically structured itself? Or in other words, under some 
conditions, do egalitarian conditions back home soften international domination? 
Does it matter whether the political system of the dominant power is democratic or 
authoritarian?
And how does it influence a system when it is penetrated by a global network of business-
government elites? Who shares international benefits of international peaceful order? 
Under which conditions is it necessary to collaborate, sharing the benefits with the 
commanders of organized violence in the countries? Adding the debate in political 
science on the so called “democratic peace” or “liberal peace” to the considerations 
in these last two sections could be helpful to start to answer these kind of questions. 
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It would be very easy to continue. At the very moment one superimposes the institutional 
considerations, the spatial dimensions of the reach of domination, and the different 
sources of power and hierarchy, a matrix emerges which opens a rich field for both 
case studies and systematic analytical research. Not all of the logical possibilities may 
be relevant, but again, finding out which ones are, seems well worthwhile.
7. Final Discussion
At the end of this attempt to fruitfully interconnect the institutional perspective, the 
dominant explanation of global inequality of income in economics, and world system 
analysis, what has been achieved, where does it point to, and what are the omissions?
World systems were introduced to the institutional approach using two main lines of 
attack. The first one, in Section 4, centered on the idea to endogenize institutions via 
the impact of various forms of international economic and political interactions on the 
key concepts of the distribution of income and economic and political resources in a 
country, which are central in the political economy approach of Acemoglu and Robinson 
taken as the point of departure. The key to this discussion seems to be the realization 
that the impact of international economic interaction on domestic distribution may be 
changed significantly, and even in sign, if rights are weakly enforced and grabbing type 
of redistributive activities are ubiquitous, especially inside and by the state. 
The second line of attack, developed in Sections 5 and 6, was centered on the idea 
to alienate institutional approaches geared towards explaining national developments 
by applying them to the entire globe. The pioneering approach of Korzeniewicz and 
Moran (2009), informed considerably by the Acemoglu and Robinson political economy 
approach (Acemoglu et al. 2005a), could gain by considering the whole range of 
interactions discussed in Section 4. Alongside that pioneering effort we added a reading 
against the grain of North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) more conservative, but also 
more differentiated account of the interaction of inequality of access to resources. 
Considerations of the paramount impact of organized violence and its social regulation 
as well as the issue of considering the privileged elite as a potentially instable coalition 
seem particularly fruitful. The argument central in North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) 
own eyes – rents from repressing the poor are central for peace in a limited access 
order – has a ring of circularity to it, given that military power – at least in modern days 
– is itself closely tied to access to economic resources. 
Moreover, this – and indeed any – reconstruction of an institutional narrative geared 
towards the national sphere on the global scale has a lot to gain by explicitly integrating 
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geographical space into its account of a hierarchical world system – the idea behind 
Section 6. Key issues retrieved from this exercise are two especially interesting spatial 
zones – the outbacks of a hierarchy, those regions not or hardly within the reach of a 
hierarchy, and the contested areas, where the claims of different centers clash. When 
combined with the idea of different varieties of hierarchies – economic, political, military 
and ideological/cultural and with the institutional considerations considered before, a 
conceptual matrix appears with the help of which a rich set of interacting influences 
can be explored.
As befits its nature, there are many omissions in this exploration of a research program 
in the making. Let me briefly touch upon two of them. Of the four dimensions of core-
periphery relations the political, the economic and the military dimensions have been 
in the center of the previous discussion – the ideological/cultural dimension has 
not. I would like to make a point in stressing that this is not because I deem it to be 
unimportant. However, while evolutionary economists have something to say on the 
change of mindsets, values and beliefs, this nevertheless is simply not the natural 
turf of economists. Here collaboration with the cultural sciences is a must and indeed, 
evolutionary economics may well be the best ground to meet. 
What is also left over for the future is a discussion of policy issues. Here I think it 
important to stress that in the above I have made a conscious effort to emphasize 
hypotheses which may support vicious and virtuous circles stabilizing a polarization 
into center and periphery, thus producing global inequality. I understand them as forces 
pressuring countries in either direction. But there may be counterforces. When returning 
to the Acemoglu and Robinson framework of Section 2, any factor making national 
political leadership interested in a more egalitarian distribution of power and resources, 
a more equal access to education and a better enforcement of rights may be of prime 
importance in this context. This line of argument had also been stressed by the work of 
Dieter Senghaas and Ulrich Menzel mentioned before (Senghaas 1982; Menzel 1988), 
a good starting point for further research in this direction. Any other forces favoring the 
coherence of national policy making are likely to help too. And as already hypothesized 
above – the weakening dominance of an ageing center may help as well.
But all this deserves a far more differentiated and less speculative discussion as the 
ideas contained in the above discussion are translated into specific research projects, 
putting the research program into action and modifying it along the way. The proof of 
the pudding is in the eating. 
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the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut of the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (IAI, 
Ibero-American Institute of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation, Berlin) are in 
overall charge of the research network.
The objective of desiguALdades.net is to work towards a shift in the research on 
social inequalities in Latin America in order to overcome all forms of “methodological 
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contexts. 
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